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Abstract
In several reinforcement learning (RL) scenarios, mainly in
security settings, there may be adversaries trying to interfere
with the reward generating process. In this paper, we intro-
duce Threatened Markov Decision Processes (TMDPs), which
provide a framework to support a decision maker against a
potential adversary in RL. Furthermore, we propose a level-k
thinking scheme resulting in a new learning framework to deal
with TMDPs. After introducing our framework and deriving
theoretical results, relevant empirical evidence is given via
extensive experiments, showing the benefits of accounting for
adversaries while the agent learns.
1 Introduction
Markov decision processes (MDP) (Howard 1960) provide a
mathematical framework for modeling a single agent making
decisions while interacting within an environment. We refer
to this agent as the decision maker (DM, she). MDPs have
been widely used to study reinforcement learning (RL) prob-
lems. More precisely, a MDP consists of a tuple pS,A, T , rq
where S is the state space; A denotes the set of actions avail-
able to the agent; T : S ˆ A Ñ ∆pSq is the transition
distribution, where ∆pXq denotes the set of all distributions
over set X; and, finally, r : SˆAÑ ∆pRq is the reward dis-
tribution (the utility the agent perceives from a given state and
action). A common approach to solving MDPs is based on Q-
learning, (Sutton and Barto 1998). In it, the agent maintains
a table Q : S ˆAÑ R that estimates the DM’s expected cu-
mulative reward, iterating according to the following update
equation
Qps, aq :“ p1´ αqQps, aq`
` α
´
rps, aq ` γmax
a1
Qps1, a1q
¯
,
(1)
where α is a learning rate hyperparameter and s1 is the
state the agent arrives at after choosing action a in state
s and receiving reward rps, aq. While learning, the agent
could choose actions according to a greedy policy (pipsq “
arg maxaQps, aq) yet it is crucial to add stochasticity so that
the agent can balance the exploration-exploitation trade-off,
for instance with an ´greedy policy.
Preprint. Work in progress.
However, when non stationary environments are consid-
ered, as when there are other learning agents that interfere
with the DM’s rewards, Q-learning leads to suboptimal re-
sults (Busoniu, Babuska, and De Schutter 2010).
1.1 Related Work
Several extensions of Q-learning in multi-agent settings
have been developed in the literature, including minimax-Q
(Littman 1994), Nash-Q (Hu and Wellman 2003) or friend-or-
foe-Q (Littman 2001), to name but a few. We propose here to
extend Q-learning from an Adversarial Risk Analysis (ARA),
(Rios Insua, Rios, and Banks 2009) perspective, in particular,
through a level-k scheme (Stahl and Wilson 1994), (Stahl
and Wilson 1995).
Within the bandit literature, the celebrated (Auer et al.
1995) introduced a non-stationary setting in which the reward
process is controlled by an adversary. The adversarial ma-
chine learning literature has predominantly focused on the su-
pervised setting (Biggio and Roli 2017). Other recent works
tackle the problem of adversarial examples in RL (Huang et
al. 2017; Lin et al. 2017) though they focus on visual inputs.
Moreover, previous game-theoretical approaches to this
problem have focused on modeling the whole multi-agent
system as a game. Instead we shall face the problem of pre-
scribing decisions to a single agent versus her opponents,
augmenting the MDP to account for potential adversaries.
We present such variant of MDPs, which we call Threatened
MDPs (TMDPs), in the next section.
2 Threatened MDPs
In similar spirit to other reformulations of MDPs such as
Constrained Markov Decision Processes (CMDP) (Altman
1999) or Configurable Markov Decision Processes (Conf-
MDP) (Metelli, Mutti, and Restelli 2018), we propose an
augmentation of the MDP to account for the presence of
adversaries. In this paper, we restrict to the case of a DM
facing a single opponent (he), leaving the extension to a
setting with multiple adversaries for future work.
A Threatened Markov Decision Process (TMDP) is a tuple
pS,A,B, T , r, pAq in which S is the state space; A denotes
the set of actions available to the supported agent; B des-
ignates the set of threat actions, or actions available to the
adversary; T : S ˆA ˆ B Ñ ∆pSq is the transition distri-
bution; r : S ˆ A ˆ B Ñ ∆pRq is the reward distribution
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(the utility the agent perceives from a given state and action
pair); and pApb|sq models the beliefs that the DM has about
his opponent move, i.e., a distribution over B for each state
s P S .
We propose to replace the standard Q-learning rule (Eq.1)
by
Qps, a, bq :“ p1´ αqQps, a, bq`
` α
´
rps, a, bq ` γmax
a1
EpApb|s1q
“
Qps1, a1, bq‰¯
(2)
and compute its expectation over the opponent’s action argu-
ment
Qps, aq :“ EpApb|sq rQps, a, bqs . (3)
This may be used to compute an ´greedy policy for
the DM, i.e., choosing with probability p1 ´ q the action
a “ arg maxa rQps, aqs or a uniformly random action with
probability  when the DM is at state s. Appendix A contains
two lemmas showing that the previous update rules are fixed
point iterations of contraction mappings.
However, in real life scenarios there will be uncertainty
regarding the adversary’s policy pApb|sq. Therefore, we pro-
pose using a level-k scheme (Rios Insua, Rios, and Banks
2009) to learn the opponent model. In general, we consider
both the DM and the adversary as rational agents that aim
to maximize their respective expected cumulative rewards,
though we start with a case in which the adversary is con-
sidered non-strategic (Section 2.1). Then, we go up a level
in the level-k hierarchy, considering the adversary a level-1
agent and the DM a level-2 one (Section 2.2).
2.1 Non-strategic opponent
We begin by considering a stateless setting. The Q-function
may be written then as Qpai, bjq, with ai P A the action
chosen by the DM, and bj P B the action chosen by the
adversary. We assume that the supported DM is a joint action
learner (i.e., she observes her opponent’s actions after he has
committed them). At every iteration, the DM shall choose her
action maximizing her expected cumulative reward. However,
she needs to predict the action bj chosen by her opponent. A
typical option is to model her adversary using fictitious play
(FP), i.e., she may compute the expected utility of action ai
via
ψpaiq “
ÿ
bjPB
Qpai, bjqpApbjq
where pApbjq reflects A’s beliefs about her opponent’s ac-
tions and is computed using the empirical frequencies of the
opponent past plays. Then she may choose the action ai P A
that maximizes her expected utility. In the following sections,
we refer to this variant as FPQ-learning.
As described in (Rios Insua, Banks, and Rios 2016), it
is possible to re-frame fictitious play from a Bayesian per-
spective. Let pj be the probability that the opponent chooses
action bj . We may place a Dirichlet prior pp1, . . . , pnq „
Dpα1, . . . , αnq. Then, the posterior has the analytical form
Dpα1 ` h1, . . . , αn ` hnq, with hi being the count of action
bi, i “ 1, ..., n. If we denote the posterior density function as
fpp|hq, then the DM would choose the action ai maximizing
her expected utility, which now takes the form
ψpaiq “
ż »– ÿ
bjPB
Qpai, bjqpj
fifl fpp|hqdp
“
ÿ
bjPB
Qpai, bjqEp|hrpis9
ÿ
bjPB
Qpai, bjqpαi ` hiq.
The Bayesian perspective may benefit the convergence of
Q-learning, as we may include prior information about the
adversary behavior when relevant.
Generalizing the previous approach to account for states
is straightforward. Now the Q-function has the form
Qpai, bj , sq, where s is the state of the TMDP. The DM
may need to asses probabilities of the form pApbj |sq, since
it is natural to expect that her opponent behaves differently
depending on the state of the game and, consequently, de-
pending also on previous actions. As before, the supported
DM may choose her action at state s by maximizing
ψspaiq “
ÿ
bjPB
Qpai, bj , sqpApbj |sq.
Since the state space S may be huge (or even continuous),
keeping track of pApbj |sq may incur in prohibitive memory
costs. Bayes rule may turn out to be useful, using
pApbj |sq 9 pps|bjqppbjq.
(Tang et al. 2017) propose an efficient method using a hash
table or a bloom filter to maintain a count of the number of
times an agent visits each state s, ppsq. This is only used in
the context of single-agent RL to assist for better exploration
of the environment. We propose to keep track of |B| “ n
bloom filters, one for each distribution pps|bjq, for tractable
computation of the opponent’s intentions in the TMDP set-
ting.
The previous scheme may be transparently integrated with
the Bayesian paradigm: we only need to store an additional
array with the Dirichlet prior parameters αi, i “ 1, . . . , n for
the ppbjq part. Potentially, we could store initial pseudocounts
as priors for each bj |s initializing the bloom filters with the
corresponding parameter values.
If we assume the opponent to have memory of the previous
stage actions, we could straightforwardly extend the previous
scheme using the concept of mixtures of Markov chains,
as described in (Raftery 1985). For example, in case the
opponent belief model is pApbt|at´1, bt´1, stq, so that the
adversary recalls the previous actions at´1 and bt´1, it could
be factorized as a mixture
pApbt|at´1, bt´1, stq “ w1pApbt|at´1q`
` w2pApbt|bt´1q ` w3pApbt|stq.
Then, if we allow for longer memories, instead of an expo-
nential growth in the number of parameters, the complexity
can be linearly controlled.
To conclude this section, we shall note that the described
scheme is model agnostic, i.e., it does not matter if we rep-
resent the Q-function using a look-up table or a deep neural
network (DQN), so we expect it to be usable in both shallow
and deep multi-agent RL settings.
2.2 Level-k thinking
The previous section described how to model a level-0 oppo-
nent, i.e. a non strategic opponent, which can be practical in
several scenarios. However, if the opponent is strategic, he
may model the supported DM as a level-0 thinker, thus mak-
ing the adversary a level-1 thinker. This chain can go up to
infinity, so we will have to deal with modeling the opponent
as a level-k thinker, with k bounded by the computational or
cognitive resources of the DM.
To deal with it, we introduce a hierarchy of TMDPs in
which TMDPki refers to the TMDP that agent i needs to
optimize, while considering its rival as a level-pk´1q thinker.
Thus, we have the following process:
• If the supported DM is a level-1 thinker, she may optimize
for TMDP1A. She then models B as a level-0 thinker (using
Section 2.1).
• If the supported DM is a level-2 thinker, she may optimize
for TMDP2A. She models B as a level-1 thinker. Conse-
quently, this “modeled” B optimizes TMDP1B , and while
doing so, he models the DM as level-0 (Section 2.1).
• In general, we have the chain of TMDPs:
TMDPkA Ñ TMDPk´1B Ñ ¨ ¨ ¨ Ñ TMDP1B .
Exploiting the fact that we are in a repeated interaction setting
(and by assumption that both agents can observe all past
committed decisions and obtained rewards), each agent may
estimate their counterpart’s Q-function, Qˆk´1: if the DM
is optimizing TMDPkA, she will keep her own Q-function
(we refer to it as Qk), and also an estimate Qˆk´1, of her
opponent’s Q-function. This estimate may be computed by
optimizing TMDPk´1B and so on until k “ 1. Finally, the top
level DM’s policy is given by
arg max
aik
Qkpaik , bjk´1 , sq,
where bjk´1 is now given by
arg max
bjk´1
Qˆk´1paik´2 , bjk´1 , sq
and so on, until we arrive at the induction basis (level-1) in
which the opponent may be modeled using the fictitious play
approach from Section 2.1.
Note that in the previous hierarchy of policies the decisions
are obtained in a greedy, deterministic manner (i.e. just by
maximizing the lower level Qˆ estimate). We may gain insight
from the Bayesian / Risk Analysis communities by adding
uncertainty to the policy at each level. For instance, at a
Level-2 (DM, denoted as A)
QA, pApb|sqø Level-1 (Adv., denoted as B)
QB , pBpa|sqø Level-0 (DM)
Figure 1: Level-k thinking scheme, with k “ 2
certain level in the hierarchy, we could consider ´greedy
policies that with probability 1´ choose an action according
to the previous scheme, and with probability  select a random
action. Thus, we may impose distributions pkpq at each level
k of the hierarchy. The mean of pkpq may be an increasing
function with respect to the level k to account for the fact that
in upper levels of thinking the uncertainty is higher. Other
approaches to add uncertainty to the policies are left for future
work.
Algorithm 1 specifies the approach for a level-2 DM. Be-
cause she is a level-2 DM, we need to account for her Q-
function, QA (equivalently Q2 from before), and that of her
opponent (who will be level-1), QB (equivalently Qˆ1q. Fig-
ure 1 provides a schematic view of the dependencies.
3 Experiments and Results
To illustrate the TMDP’s and level-k reasoning framework,
we consider two sets of experiments: repeated matrix games,
with and without memory, and the adversarial environment
proposed in (Leike et al. 2017). All the code is released
at https://github.com/vicgalle/ARAMARL. The
interested reader might check the previous repository or the
Supplementary Material B for experimental setup details.
3.1 Repeated matrix games
Memoryless Repeated Matrix Games As an initial base-
line, we focus on the stateless version of a TMDP. We con-
sider the classical Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) (Axel-
rod 1984), and analyze the policies learned by the supported
DM, who will be the row player, against several kinds of
opponents. Table 1 shows the reward bimatrix prA, rBq for
the Prisoner’s Dilemma. To construct the iterated game, we
set the discount factor γ “ 0.96 in the experiments so agent
i P tA,Bu aims at optimizing ř8t“0 γtrit.
Table 1: Payoff Matrix of Prisoners’ Dilemma
C D
C (-1, -1) (-3, 0)
D (0, -3) (-2, -2)
To start with, we consider that the opponent is an
independent-Q learner (i.e., he uses the standard Q-function
from single-agent RL and Eq. 1 as learning rule). Figures
2(a) and 2(b) depict the utilities obtained over time, in cases
where we model the DM as another independent Q-learner
(Fig. 2(a)) or as a joint Q-learner with fictitious play (FPQ-
learner), Fig. 2(b). Note that the FP playing solution (level-1)
Algorithm 1 Level-2 thinking update rule
Require: QA, QB , αA, αB (DM and opponent Q-functions and learning rates, respectively).
Observe transition ps, a, b, rA, rB , s1q from the TMDP environment
QBps, b, aq :“ p1´ αBqQBps, b, aq ` αBprB ` γmaxb1 EpBpa1|s1q rQBps1, b1, a1qsq Ź Level-1
Compute B’s estimated ´greedy policy pApb|s1q from QBps, b, aq
QAps, a, bq :“ p1´ αAqQAps, a, bq ` αAprA ` γmaxa1 EpApb1|s1q rQAps1, a1, b1qqs Ź Level-2
converges to the Nash equilibrium. The DM reaches the equi-
librium strategy first, becoming stationary to her opponent,
and thus pulling him to play towards the equilibrium strategy.
In contrast, the opponent-unaware solution would remain ex-
ploitable by another adversary (i.e., independent Q-learning
does not converge). Also note that in Fig. 2(a) the variance
is much bigger due to the inability of the basic Q-learning
solution to deal with a non-stationary environment.
We turn to another social dilemma game in which both
agents must coordinate to maximize their rewards, the Stag
Hunt game, with payoff matrix shown in Table 2. We focus
on its iterated version referred to as ISH.
Table 2: Payoff Matrix of Stag Hunt
C D
C (2, 2) (0, 1)
D (1, 0) (1, 1)
We repeated the same experimental setting as in the IPD
and report the results in Figure 3. Once again, the independent
learning solution cannot tackle the non-stationarity of the
environment, so it oscillates between the two Nash equilibria
(C,C) and (D,D) without a clear convergence to one of them
(Fig. 3(a)). On the other hand, the FPQ-learner converges
earlier to the socially optimal policy. Then, the environment
becomes essentially stationary for its opponent, who also
converges to that policy.
The last social dilemma that we consider is the Chicken
game, with payoff matrix in Table 3. This game has two pure
Nash equilibria (C, D) and (D,C).
Table 3: Payoff Matrix of Chicken
C D
C (0, 0) (-2, 1)
D (1, -2) (-4, -4)
Results are reported in Figure 4. Figure 4(a) depicts again
the ill convergence due to lack of opponent awareness in the
independent Q-learning method. We noted that the instabil-
ities continued cycling even after the limit in the displayed
graphics. On the other hand, the DM with opponent mod-
eling has an advantage and converges to her optimal Nash
equilibrium (D,C) (Fig. 4(b)).
In addition, we also consider another kind of opponent to
show our framework can adapt to it. We consider an adversary
that learns according to the WoLF-PHC algorithm (Bowling
and Veloso 2001). Figure 5(a) depicts a FP-Q learner (level-1)
against this adversary, where the latter exploits the former.
However, if we go up in the level-k hierarchy and model the
DM as a level-2 Q-learner, she outperforms her opponent
(Fig. 5(b)).
Repeated Matrix Games With Memory In this section
we give both players memory of past actions, in order to
account for TMDP’s with different states. We can augment
the agents to have memory of the past K joint actions taken.
However, (Press and Dyson 2012) proved that agents with
a good memory-1 strategy can effectively force the iterated
game to be played as memory-1, ignoring larger play histo-
ries. Thus, we resort to memory-1 iterated games here.
We may model the memory-1 IPD as a TMDP, in which
the state S consists of elements of the form
st “ pat´1, bt´1q, t ą 0
describing the previous joint action, plus the initial
state s0 in which there is no prior action. Note
that now, the DM’s policy is conditioned on S, so
it may be fully specified by the |S| probabilities
pipC|CCq, pipC|CDq, pipC|DCq, pipC|DDq, pipC|s0q.
We assume an stationary adversary playing TitForTat
(TFT), i.e. replicating the opponent’s previous action, (Axel-
rod 1984). He will compete with either another agent playing
FP, or with a memory-1 agent also playing FP. In Figure 6
we represent the utilities perceived by these agents in both
duels. As can be seen, a memoryless FPQ player cannot learn
an optimal policy, and forces the TFT agent to play defect.
In contrast, augmenting this agent to have memory of the
previous move allows him to learn the optimal policy (TFT),
that is, he learns to cooperate.
3.2 AI Safety Gridworlds
A suite of RL safety benchmarks was recently introduced in
(Leike et al. 2017). We focus on the friend or foe environment,
in which the supported DM needs to travel a room and choose
between two identical boxes, hiding positive and negative
rewards, respectively. This reward assignment is controlled
by an adaptive adversary. Figure 7 shows the initial state in
this game. The blue cell depicts the DM’s initial state, gray
cells represent the walls of the room. Cells 1 and 2 depict
the adversary’s targets, who will decide which one will hide
the positive reward. This game may also be interpreted as a
spatial Stackelberg game, in which the adversary is planning
to attack one of two targets, and the defender (DM) will
obtain a positive reward if she travels to the chosen target.
Otherwise, she will miss the attacker and will incur in a loss.
As shown in (Leike et al. 2017), the deep Q-network (and
similarly the independent tabular Q-learner as we will show)
fails to achieve optimal results because the reward process is
(a) Q-learner vs Q-learner (b) FPQ-learner (blue) vs Q-learner (red)
Figure 2: Rewards obtained in IPD. We plot the trajectories of 10 simulations with shaded colors. Darker curves depict mean
rewards along the 10 simulations.
(a) Q-learner vs Q-learner (b) FPQ-learner (blue) vs Q-learner (red)
Figure 3: Rewards in the iterated stag hunt game
(a) Q-learner vs Q-learner (b) FPQ-learner (blue) vs Q-learner (red)
Figure 4: Rewards in the iterated chicken game
(a) FPQ-learner (blue) vs WoLF-learner (red) (b) L2Q-learner (blue) vs WoLF-learner (red)
Figure 5: Rewards obtained in the iterated chicken game against a WoLF-PHC adversary.
Figure 6: Rewards obtained for two different iterated games:
TFT player vs FPQ memoryless player (G1) and TFT player
vs FPQ memory-1 player (G2)
Figure 7: The friend or foe environment from the AI Safety
Gridworlds benchmark. Figure taken from (Leike et al. 2017).
controlled by the adversary. We show that by explicitly mod-
eling the adversary we actually improve Q-learning methods
to achieve optimal utilities.
Stateless Variant We first consider a simplified environ-
ment with a singleton state and two actions. In a similar
spirit to (Leike et al. 2017), the adaptive opponent esti-
mates the DM’s actions using an exponential smoother. Let
p “ pp1, p2q be the probabilities with which the DM will
choose targets 1 or 2, respectively, as estimated by the op-
ponent. Then, at every iteration he updates his knowledge
through
p :“ αp` p1´ αqa
where 0 ă α ă 1 is a learning rate, unknown from the
DM’s point of view, and a P tp1, 0q, p0, 1qu is a one-hot en-
coded vector indicating whether the DM has chosen targets
1 or 2. We consider an adversarial opponent which places
the positive reward in target t “ arg minippqi. As an exam-
ple, in the beginning of a game, the opponent has estimate
p “ p0.5, 0.5q of the preferred target for the DM. If she
chooses target 1, then opponent’s estimate of p1 will increase.
Henceforth, in the next round he will place the positive re-
ward in target 2.
Since the DM has to deal with an adaptive adversary, we in-
troduce a modification to the FP-Q learning algorithm. Lever-
aging the property that the Dirichlet distribution is a conju-
gate prior of the Categorical distribution, a modified update
scheme is proposed in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Dirichlet updating with a forget factor
Initialize pseudocounts α0 “ pα01, . . . , α0Kq
for t “ 1, . . . , T do
αt “ λαt´1 Ź Reweight with factor 0 ă λ ă 1
Observe opponent action bti, i P tb1, . . . , bKu
αti “ αt´1i ` 1 Ź Update posterior
αt´i “ αt´1´i
end for
It essentially allows to account for the last 11´λ opponent
actions, instead of weighting all observations equally. For
Figure 8: Rewards against the adversarial opponent
the case of a level-2 defender, as we do not know the actual
rewards of the adversary (who will be modeled as a level-
1 learner), we may model it as in a zero-sum scenario, i.e.
rB “ ´rA. Other reward scalings for rB were also consid-
ered, though they did not qualitatively affect the results (See
Supplementary Material C).
Results are displayed in Figure 8. We considered four
types of defenders: opponent-agnostic Q-learner, a level-1
DM with forget and a level-2 agent. The first one is exploited
by the adversary and, therefore, achieves suboptimal results.
In contrast, the level-1 DM with forget effectively learns
an stationary optimal policy (reward 0). Finally, the level-2
agent learns to exploit the adaptive agent achieving positive
reward.
Note that the actual adversary behaves differently from
how the DM models him, i.e. he is not exactly a level-1 Q-
learner. Even so, modeling him as a level-1 agent gives the
DM sufficient advantage.
Spatial Variant We now compare the independent Q-
learner and a level-2 Q-learner against the same adaptive
opponent in a spatial gridworld domain, Figure 7. Targets’
rewards are delayed until the DM arrives at one of the re-
spective locations, obtaining ˘50 depending on the target
chosen by the adversary. Each step is penalized with a reward
of -1 for the DM. Results are displayed in Figure 9. Once
again, the independent Q-learner is exploited by the adver-
sary, getting even more negative rewards than in Figure 8 due
to the penalty taken at each step. In contrast, the level-2 agent
is able to approximately estimate the adversarial behavior,
modeling him as a level-1 agent, thus being able to obtain
positive rewards.
4 Conclusions and further work
We have introduced TMDPs, a novel variant of MDPs. This
is an original framework to support decision makers who
confront adversaries that interfere with the reward generating
process in reinforcement learning settings. TMDP’s aim to
provide one-sided prescriptive support to a DM, maximizing
her subjective expected utility, taking into account potential
negative actions taken by an adversary. Some theoretical re-
Figure 9: Rewards against the adversarial opponent in the
spatial environment
sults are provided, in particular, we proved that our proposed
learning rule is a contraction mapping so that we may use
standard RL results of convergence. In addition, we propose
a scheme to model adversarial behavior based on level-k
reasoning about opponents. Further empirical evidence is
provided via extensive experiments, with encouraging re-
sults.
Several lines of work are possible for further research.
First of all, we have limited to the case of facing just one
adversary. The framework could be extended to the case of
having multiple adversaries. In the experiments, we have just
considered up to level-2 DM’s, though the extension to higher
order adversaries seems straightforward.
In addition, in recent years Q-learning has benefited from
advances from the deep learning community, with break-
throughs such as the deep Q-network (DQN) which achieved
super-human performance in control tasks such as Atari
games (Mnih et al. 2015), or as inner blocks inside systems
that play Go (Silver et al. 2017). Integrating these advances
into the TMDP setting is another possible research path. In
particular, the proposed Algorithm 1 can be generalized to
account for the use of deep Q-networks instead of tabular
Q-learning.
Finally, it might be interesting to explore similar expan-
sions of semi-MDPs, in order to perform Hierarchical RL or
allow for time-dependent rewards and transitions between
states.
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APPENDIX
A PROOFS
Lemma 1. Given q : SˆBˆAÑ R, the following operator
H is a contraction mapping
pHqqps, b, aq “
ÿ
s1
pps1|s, b, aq“rps, b, aq`
` γmax
a1
Eppb1|s1qqps1, b1, a1q
‰
.
Proof. We show thatH is a contraction under the supremum
norm, i.e., }Hq1 ´Hq2}8 ď γ}q1 ´ q2}8.
}Hq1 ´Hq2}8 “
“ max
s,b,a
|
ÿ
s1
pps1|s, b, aq“rps, b, aq ` γmax
a1
Eppb1|s1qq1ps1, b1, a1q
´ rps, b, aq ´ γmax
a1
Eppb1|s1qq2ps1, b1, a1q
‰| “
“ γmax
s,b,a
|
ÿ
s1
pps1|s, b, aq“max
a1
Eppb1|s1qq1ps1, b1, a1q
´max
a1
Eppb1|s1qq2ps1, b1, a1q
‰| ď
“ γmax
s,b,a
ÿ
s1
pps1|s, b, aq|max
a1
Eppb1|s1qq1ps1, b1, a1q
´max
a1
Eppb1|s1qq2ps1, b1, a1q| ď
“ γmax
s,b,a
ÿ
s1
pps1|s, b, aqmax
a1,z
|Eppb1|zqq1pz, b1, a1q
´ Eppb1|zqq2pz, b1, a1q| ď
“ γmax
s,b,a
ÿ
s1
pps1|s, b, aq max
a1,z,b1
|q1pz, b1, a1q ´ q2pz, b1, a1q| “
“ γmax
s,b,a
ÿ
s1
pps1|s, b, aq}q1 ´ q2}8 “
“ γ}q1 ´ q2}8.
Lemma 2. Let q¯ : S ˆA Ñ R. The following operator H¯
is a contraction mapping
pH¯q¯qps, aq “
“ Eppb|sq
«ÿ
s1
pps1|s, b, aq
´
rps, b, aq ` γmax
a1
q¯ps1, a1q
¯ff
.
Proof. Similar to Lemma 1, using the property that
Eafpaq ď maxa fpaq for any distribution ppaq.
B EXPERIMENT DETAILS
We describe hyperparameters and other technical details used
to obtain the results.
B.1 REPEATED MATRIX GAMES
Memoryless Repeated Matrix Games In all three games
(IPD, ISH, IC) we considered a discount factor γ “ 0.96, a
total of max steps T “ 20000, initial  “ 0.1 and learning
rate α “ 0.3.
The FP-Q learner started the learning process with a Beta
prior Bp1, 1q.
RepeatedMatrix GamesWithMemory In the IPD game
we considered a discount factor γ “ 0.96, a total of max steps
T “ 20000, initial  “ 0.1 and learning rate α “ 0.05.
The FP-Q learner started the learning process with a Beta
prior Bp1, 1q.
B.2 AI SAFETY GRIDWORLDS
Stateless Variant Rewards for the DM are 50,´50 de-
pending on her action and the target chosen by the adversary.
We considered a discount factor γ “ 0.8 and a total of
5000 episodes. For all three agents, the initial exploration
parameter was set to  “ 0.1 and learning rate α “ 0.1. The
FP-Q learner with forget factor used λ “ 0.8.
Spatial Variant Episodes end at a maximum of 50 steps
or agent arriving first at target 1 or 2. Rewards for the DM
are ´1 for performing any action (i.e., a step in some of the
four possible directions) or 50,´50 depending on the target
chosen by the adversary.
We considered a discount factor γ “ 0.8 and a total of
15000 episodes. For the level-2 agent, initial A “ B “ 0.99
with decaying rules A :“ 0.995A and B :“ 0.9B every
10 episodes and learning rates αA “ αB “ 0.05. For the
independent Q-learner we set initial exploration rate  “
0.99 with decaying rule  :“ 0.995 every 10 episodes and
learning rate α “ 0.05.
C ADDITIONAL RESULTS
For the experiments from Section 3.2 we tried other models
for the opponent’s rewards rB . Instead of assuming a mini-
max setting (rB “ rA), where rB P t´50, 50u, we tried also
two different scalings rB P t´1, 1u and rB P t0, 1u. These
alternatives are displayed in Figure 10, though we found they
did not qualitatively affect the results.
(a) Rewards `1 and 0 for the adversary
(b) Rewards `1 and ´1 for the adversary
Figure 10: Rewards against the same adversary (exponential
smoother) using different reward scalings.
